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Abstract--The optimization problem of an n-person noncooperative discounted vector valued dynamic 
game with a stopped set is investigated. A D-convex equilibrium point as the optimization criterion in 
the game is defined under a domination structure of a convex cone D. We show that there exists such 
a D-convex equilibrium point in the game system. A modified game system of the original game is 
formulated which is weighted by a vector factor so that an equilibrium point of the modified game system 
is still a D-convex equilibrium point of the original game system. Conversely, under some additional 
conditions a D-convex equilibrium point will become an equilibrium point of the modified game system. 
Further, a relation of D-convex equilibrium point and the super-gradient is discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A two-person zero-sum discounted vector valued dynamic game model on an infinite horizon was 
first investigated by Tanaka [9]. This paper can be regarded as a continuation of[9]. We consider 
an n-person game with a vector loss rate function for each player which will be associated with 
a stopped set. For the vector valued dynamic game, we define a D-convex noncooperative 
equilibrium point in the game system under the domination structure determined by a convex 
cone D. It is analogous to the domination structure in a multiobjective optimization problem. But, 
in the game system, each player has his own strategy space, and each player chooses a strategy 
from his strategy space based on some principle. So the same model is pretty different from the 
multiobjective model controlled by one player. Furthermore, the dynamic property plays an 
important role in the game system. 
In this paper, we modify the game system to be a new n-person noncooperative discounted 
Markov game with a stopped set by using a scalarizer to the vector rate loss function of each 
player. From this method, we derive a scalarization for the total expected iscounted vector loss 
of each player and find an equilibrium point in such modified game (cf. [4]). So we show that this 
equilibrium point is a D-convex equilibrium point satisfying the individual stability for each player 
under the given domination structure. Then, under the convexity of the feasible set of the total 
expected iscounted vector loss for all players, we prove that the above converse version is true, 
i.e. a D-convex equilibrium point of the original game system is an equilibrium point of the 
modified game system (cf. [9]). Furthermore, the related problem concerned with super-gradients 
is also discussed. 
This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we give a formulation of an n-person 
noncooperative discounted vector valued dynamic game with a stopped set. Section 3 gives us the 
necessary assumptions and the definitions of a D-convex optimal strategy as well as a D-convex 
equilibrium point. In Section 4, we show the existence of a D-convex equilibrium point in the game 
system. It is shown in Section 5 that a D-convex equilibrium point is an equilibrium point in some 
modified game system provided it satisfies ome conditions. Finally, we give a relation between the 
D-convex equilibrium point and the super-gradients. 
TThis research was supported by thc National Science Council, Taiwan, Republic of China. 
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2. FORMULAT ION OF AN n -PERSON DISCOUNTED VECTOR VALUED 
DYNAMIC  GAME WITH A STOPPED SET 
Consider a noncooperative n-person vector valued Markov game with a discount factor and a 
stopped set as the following 2n + 4 objects: 
(S ,S ' ,A  t . . . . .  A" ,q , r  t . . . . .  r",c~). (1) 
Here we define that 
(1) S = {1, 2 . . . . .  s . . . .  } is a countable set of  states in the game system, namely, the state space; 
(2) S '  ~ S is a subset in which the game process will be stopped when the state goes into S '  and 
this set S '  is called a stopped set; 
(3) A' is the action space of player i. We assume that each A ~ is a compact metric space, 
i • N - (1, 2 . . . . .  n } where N is the player set. 
(4) q = q(. [s, 6) is a bounded function, namely, a transition rate function, for any (s, 6) e S x A, 
where 
a = ( a~ ~ ( I  ,a- ,  . . . .  a~)eA = A'; 
i - I  
I (5) r ~ = (r' t, r2 . . . . .  r~) is an m-dimensional vector valued loss rate function of  player i defined 
on the set S x A, i.e. 
r~:S x A-~Nm: 
and 
(6) ~ is a positive number, as a discount.factor. 
This Markov game with a stopped set is sketched in Lai and Tanaka [4]. For convenience to 
readers, we reexplain this game system as follows. 
In the game processes, the players observe the variable state s, • S at any time t e [0, oo) and then, 
they choose their actions ~i, under some probability measure/i,, depending on the observed state 
value without any collaboration with the others players. Depending upon this result, each player 
i • N has a vector loss 
r i(s,  d,) (r'i(s,, a,) . . . .  ' = . rm(S ,, 6,)), (2) 
and then the game process moves to a new state which is governed by the transition rate q (.Is,, a,). 
Our optimization problem is to minimize each player's total expected iscounted vector loss until 
the game process arrives at a stopped set S'. 
Throughout this paper, we assume that all strategies applied by the players are only the 
stationary strategies, i.e. each strategy chosen by each player at any time is independent of  the time 
t and depends only on the present state. In this case, for any t • [0, oc), there is a mapping 
I~'~ =/~': S - - *P (A i ) ,  i.e. I~'•[P(A')]s;  for simplicity, we write P(A  ~) instead of [P(A~)] s as the 
stationary strategy space of the player i • N. Here P(A  ~) is the set of  all probability measures on 
the Borel measurable space [A ', fl (A ')], where fl (A') is the Borel field of  the compact metric space 
A~for each ieN.  
In this game system with a stopped set, we need some assumptions as follows. 
(A 1 ) q(k  Is, 6) is a continuous function on ti • A for every (k, s) e S x S, moreover, for any d e A 
q(k ls ,  d )~O if k ~s ,  
(A2) 
W q(k l s ,  d )=O,  
k c ,S" 
]q(s ls,  d ) l<~M fora l l  s~S.  
For each i ~ N, ri(s, d) is continuous on A for a given s 6 S and bounded on S x A, i.e. 
each component of  ri(s, d) is bounded and continuous. If s '6  S' ,  ri(s ', d )= ri(s'), which 
is independent of  d ~ A. 
Discounted vector valued dynamic game model 
For a multistrategy/~ e P(A)  = f i  P(A % we write 
i~l 
r'(s, it) [r',(s, fi) . . . .  i = , rm(s,/~)], 
where 
and write 
( '  
- I r ) ( s ,~)~(d~ls ) ,  j=  rj(s, p) = 1, 2 . . . . .  m, J~ 
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with an initial condition 
P(fi)(0) = I, the infinite identity matrix. 
Then, at any time t ~ [0, ~)  the state s, in the game process makes a Markov chain corresponding 
to the transition probability matrix P(~)(t )  and is well behaved. Thus, for a given initial state so = s, 
the expected vector loss of each player i at any time t is given by 
where 
E~[r':(s,, ft)lso = s] = ~ ri(k, IJ)p,(k Is,/1) 
keS 
i . . . . . .  E~[r,,(s,, fi)ls0 = s]), (5) (E~[rl(s,, #)Is0 s], i 
where E~ denotes the expectation operator elated to a stationary strategy/~. So under the discount 
factor c~, the total expected iscounted vector loss for player i is defined by 
If0 ~i(ti)(s) = E¢ exp( -~t )  ri(s,, ~) dt + exp(-~r)r"(s~)ls0 = s , (6) 
where r is the first time that the variable state s, arrives at the stopped set S'. From (5) and (6), 
the vector expression of 0'Oi)(s) is written as 
O~(fL)(s) [q '~l (~)(s) ,  ' - . . . . .  ~ , . , (u ) (s ) ] ,  
~)(p)(s) = Ea exp( -~t )  r~(s,, ~) dt + exp(-~r)r~(sT)ls o = s . 
f" 
q(k Is,~) = JA q(kls,  fi)/~(dfils). 
Then, the assumption (A l) leads to 
(A l ' )q (k l s , [O~O if k~s  
q(k ls, fO = O 
keS 
Iq(sls,/~)l~<M for any s~S and /~P(A) .  
Now, we introduce the transition rate matrix by 
O(~) = {q(k Is,/~) Is, k e S}. (3) 
Under (AI') it is well known (cf. Kakumanu [3]) that there exists a unique stationary transition 
probability matrix 
p(~) ( t )  = {p,(A: ts, ~)Lk, s ~ S} 
associated with Q(~) satisfying the Kolomogorov forward differential equation: 
d 
d~ P (/7)(0 = P (/7)(0 Q (fi) (4) 
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In this paper, our purpose is to find a mult is t rategy/ i ,  n which each component  o f / i ,  satisfies 
the individual stability for each player in the sense of domination structure. This means that / i ,  
is a kind of noncooperat ive quil ibrium point under the dominat ion structure, such that every 
player has his smallest total expected discounted vector loss. A necessary and sufficient condition 
for the existence theorem of such equil ibrium point will be established. Some related properties are 
also discussed. 
3. SOME ASSUMPTIONS AND THE DOMINAT ION STRUCTURE IN 
A VECTOR VALUED n-PERSON DYNAMIC GAME 
For the player set N, we introduce 
[= { j•U l j  C i}.  
Each player i distinguishes the strategy it 'e P(A ' )  from the multistrategy 
i t ;=( i t '  . . . . .  it' ' , i t '+ '  . . . . .  i t " )• l - [P (A  j) 
. j# i  
employed by all players except i. From the view point of  player i, the multistrategy can be 
decomposed as follows 
fi = (it,, iti) • P(A' )  x ~I P (AQ 
)~s i 
and, if e~'EP(A'), then 
(or', It ;) = (it 1 . . . . .  it' ~,a',it '+~ . . . . .  it")• P(A).  
Every action space A ~, i • N, is a compact  metric space so that it is separable, and then the space 
C(A') of continuous function of A' is a separable Banach space upon the supremum norm 
topology. It is known that P(A ') is a weak* closed unit sphere in M(A') ,  the dual space of C(A i). 
Hence P(A is a metrizable compact  convex subset of M(A% So 
P(A ) = [ I  P(A ') 
i= l  
is also metrizable compact convex subset of 
M(A)= f i  M(A ' )  
i=1  
(cf. Lai and Tanaka [4]). 
For any subset F of ~m, the positive polar cone of F is given by 
F*={y•~" l (x ,y )~>0 fora l l  x•F} .  (7) 
A cone [F] generated by a subset F in ~"  is defined by 
[F] = {y • ~ ' IY  = 2x, x • F, 2 • ~+}. (8) 
A convex cone is a cone as well as a convex subset in a linear space. 
Now, we consider a cone L c ff~" such that 
(i) L~0 
{ / (ii) L U ~0f ~ D is a convex cone with vertex at the origin 0 
(iii) L +={ye~ml<x,y )>0 for all x•L}4=0.  
Throughout  this paper, we will always use the convex sets L and D. 
D¢lqnition I 
A strategy Iti for player i is a D-com~ex optimal strategy associated with 
It, _= (it ~ . . . . .  it, t, it,+ ~ . . . . .  it") under an initial state s if there is no other strategy ~' • P(A ') such 




~b'(y', #i)(s) e ~ '(rr',/~;)(s) + L. (9) 
H~(#;) i i i , = {~O (a ,/~ )(~)lrr~e P(A')} 
Ext[H~(#;)l D] 
be the set of all total expected discounted vector losses corresponding to a D-convex optimal 
strategy of player i for the given multistrategy ~t;chosen by the other players. Each element ~ i(fi)(s) 
of  Ext[H](y;) l  D] is called the D-extremum of the total expected vector losses for ith player, i e N. 
Definition 2 
A mult istrategy/7,  is said to be a D-convex noncooperative quilibrium point for an initial state 
s i f fo r  any i•N ,  
¢ ~(/7 , )(s)  e Ext[n~(y~,)I D]. (10) 
Note that this equil ibrium point f i ,  = (fi~, . . . . .  /7'g) satisfies the individual stability. 
Now, for a vector d = (d ~, d 2 . . . . .  d ' )  E (L+) " = L + x L + x • - • × L + as a weighted factor, the 
vector loss function 
((67, 0 (/7)(s))) = ((dr, qJ'(fi)(s)) . . . . .  (d ' ,  O"(fi)(s))) (I 1) 
in which each component  makes the scalarization of each player's expected discounted vector 
loss function. We find a D-convex noncooperat ive quil ibrium point for the game, where 
qJ~(.)(s) = [~9sl(-)(s) . . . . .  ~k~,(.)(s)] and d i= (d't . . . . .  d',,) e Em. Then, the following lemma plays an 
important role. 
Lemma 1 
Let 2 = (d ~ . . . .  , d ' )e  (L+)" and a multistrategy /7 be an equilibrium point for the function 
((67, ~k (')(s))) = ( (d  I, ~ ' ( ' ) (s) )  . . . . .  (d ' ,  $ ' ( ' ) ( s ) ) ) ,  
i.e. for an initial state s and for all i e N, 
(d  i, ~'(/7)(s)) < (d  ~, $~(a ~, t~;)(s)) for all a~e P(A') .  
Then this multistrategy /7 is a D-convex equil ibrium point for the initial state s. 
Proq[ 
Suppose that / / i s  not a D-convex equil ibrium point. Then, there is a player i e N such that his 
total expected vector loss is not a D-extremum, i.e. there exists /7 e P (A)  such that 
~,i(fi)(s)q~Ext[H~.(yi)lD ] for some i eN.  
Hence there would exists rrie P(A ' )  such that 
q,i(/7)(s) ~ ~'(G', ~;)(s) + L, 
or there is d'. e L such that 
~,'(/7)(s) = ~,'(~', l,;)(s ) + d',. 
Since (d',  d~,) > 0, it follows that 
(di, ~9'(/7)(s)) > (d', ~'(a  i, It;)(s)). 
This contradicts the hypothesis that fi is an equil ibrium point. Therefore the proof  to the lemma 
is completed. []  
t AM~,A  13 I-3 P 
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4. THE EX ISTENCE OF A D-CONVEX EQUIL IBR IUM POINT IN THE 
D ISCOUNTED MARKOV GAME 
Now, in view of Lemma 1, to find the existence of a D-convex equilibrium point it is sufficient 
to find an equilibrium point of the vector loss function {~c7, ¢ (.)(s))) on P(A ) for a given weighting 
vector factor 3 ~ (L+) ''. From (11), the numerical loss function of player i in ((~7, 0 (fi)(s))) can be 
rewritten as 
<d ~, ~9~(fi)(s)) ' , - = = ccr ) r i ( s  ~ )1 s,, = s djOj(p)(s) djE~ exp( -~t ) r i ( s , , f i )d t  + exp( -  i 
i=1 j= l  
If, ] =Et- , exp( -~t ){d ' ,N(s~, f i ) )d t  + exp( -ar ){d ' , r ' ( s~) l so=s  , (12) 
where the integrand (d ~, ' • r (s.  f i)) is the key point in the vector valued Markov game. So we 
consider a modified n-person discounted Markov game as the following type 
(S, S', A I . . . . .  A", q, ~d I, r l )  . . . . .  d", r"), ~). (13) 
In the new game system (13), the loss function (d ~, r ~) of player i is different from the loss rate 
function r ~ in original game system (1) and, from (A2), (d  ~, r'(s, a) )  is continuous on A for given 
s ~ Sand bounded on S x A. Further, i fs '  e S', (d  ~, ri(s ', a) )  = (d', #(s ' ) )  is independent o fa  6 A. 
Then, applying the results established by the authors in the previous paper [4], we can show that 
there exists an equilibrium point in the modified n-person Markov game. 
For convenience to readers, we will give an outline mentioned in [4] as follows. 
Let C(S)  be the space of all bounded real valued functions on S. Then C(S)  is a Banach space 
under the supremum norm. For any u e C(S),  we define 
T,(fi)u(s) = P( f i ) ( t )u(s)  = ~ u(k)p~(k Is, fi), t ~[0, ~)  
k 
and one finds easily that 
(T1) lira T, ( f i )u(s)= To(f i )u(s)= u(s) 
t -+ 0 
(T2) T,,(fi) T~2(fi)u(s) = T~, +,,(fi)u(s) 
(by the Chapman-Kolomogorov equation). 
Thus {Tt(fi), t e[0, ~)} is a one parameter semigroup of operators on C(S).  Applying the 
Kolomogorov forward differential equations (4), it would have 
d 
dt T,(f i )u(s)= T,(f i )Q(f i )u(s)  (14) 
with an initial condition 
T0(fi) = I. 
From (14) we see that Q(fi) is an infinitesimal generator of the semigroup. Then, from the direct 
calculation, we obtain (cf. Lemma 2 of [5]). 
Lemma 2 
For f i~P(A)  and ueC(S) ,  we have 
u(s) = ,)~f' exp(-ct t )T , ( f i ) (~l  - Q(fi))u(s)dt 
and 
(15) 
T,( f i )u(s)=exp[tQ(f i ) ]u(s)  for t e[O,.~,). (16) 
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Now, for each fi E P(A), we define a new one step transition probability matrix P(ji) by 
P(P) = I+ ; Q(P), (17) 
where I is the identity matrix, M is the positive constant which appeared in (Al) and Q(p) defined 
in (3) is the infinitesimal generator of {T,(p)} 0 d t < co. That is, for (k, s) E S x S, 




0 if s#k 
1 if s=k. 
For each i E N, we denote by C,(S) the set of all bounded real valued functions u on S in which 
the function u takes value (d’, r’(s’)) when s’ E S’. Since P(A) is compact and (d’, r’(s, ji)) and 
P(p) are continuous and multilinear on P(A), we can define an operator P(j): Ci(S) -+ C,(S) by 
1 Cd’, e, P)) + A4 T’(fi)u (s) = a+M -P((li)u(s), if s ES - S’ a+M (18) 
I (d’, r’(s’)) if s’ E S’, 
where a > 0 is the discount factor and 
W)u(S) = C u(k)p(k Is, B). 
ksS 
Since 0 < M/(M + CI) < 1, T’(p) is a contraction operator on C,(S), there thus exists a unique fixed 
point u’(ji) E C,(S) depending on ii such that 
i 
Cd’, es, m> + M 
W)(s) = Ct+A4 
,+Mp(j)~i(fi)(s) if s E S - S’ (19) 
I (d’, r’(.s’)) if s’ E S’. (20) 
From (17) putting P(P) = I + (l/M) Q(k), we obtain 
MU’(~)(S) = (d’, r’(s, p)) + Q(ji)u’(fi)(s) if s E S - S’ 
or 
]@Z- QWluYfi)(~) = Cd’, r’k 8)). 
Inserting (21) into (15) in Lemma 2, we have 
s 
J; 
u’(/I)(s) = exp( -cct) T,(p)(d’, r’(s, fi))dt. 
0 
Since (d’, r’(s, p)) E C,(S), there exists a constant K > 0 such that 
II u’W) II G K/a for all ji E P(X). 
Then, from (16) in Lemma 2 and (22), we obtain (cf. Lemmas 2 and 3 in [5]). 
Lrmmu 3 
For any s ES and i EN, uj(fi)(s) is continuous on P(A). 
Next, we introduce an operator ?: C,(S) -+ C,(S) by 
Cd’, r’b, (a’, @-;)I) + if YES-S’ 
P”(/& (s) = hf+tl 
(21) 
(22) 
I (d’, r’(s’)) if s’ E S’ 
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Since 0 < M/(M + ~) < 1, T~ is a contraction operator  on G(S) ,  there thus exists a unique fixed 
point u~(/~ ) e C,(S) such that 
au ' (p i ) ( s )  min {(d ' ,  i , = r (s,(a, pi)) + O(a', l J)u'(p;)(s)} 
a~ 
and 
ui(p/)(s ') = (d',  r'(s)) if s '  ~ S'.  
For simplicity, for each i e N and s ~ S - S', we let 
/ j ) f  = (d  ~, #[s,(a', ~)] )  + Q(a', l~;)u'(lt;)(s) for 
L~(a', \ = d i ( , r ' ( s ' ) )  for s ~S '  
and 
if s~S-S '  (23) 
s ~S -S '  
= P(A ) [L~(z ,p" )= min L~.(a ,p) (s )  . 
aiE p(,qi) 
Since L~(a i, p~) is continuous and linear on a i in the compact set P(A 9, the minimum surely exists. 
Hence G~.(p i) is a nonempty,  closed convex subset of P(Ai). Thus, we can define an operator 
G,: P (X)~ 2 e~x~ by 
G dfi) = {• = (),~ . . . . .  2")[),i G G~(fi), i G N}. 
Applying an argument similar to the proof  of  Lemma 3 in [5], we see that G~(fi) is a lower 
semi-continuous operator,  and so by Ky Fan's  fixed point theorem, there exists a fi ,  ~ P(A ) such 
that f i ,  ~ Gdfi,).  Therefore we have the following. 
Lemma 4 
For each i ~ N, there exists f i ,  E P(A)  such that for each s ~ S 
i - z t Ls (P , )= min L , (a ,p~,) .  (24) 
cr~ P(A I ) 
By the above preparations, we come to one of  our main theorems. 
Theorem 1 
Under the Assumptions (A l) and (A2), the game (1) has a D-convex noncooperative equilibrium 
point. 
Proo[ 
By Lemmas 3 and 4, for s ~ S - S' ,  we have 
~u~(p',)(s) ~< (d', #[s, (a', /~',)]) + Q(a ~, #~)u' (p~)(s )  for any a~ P(A') ,  
i .e. 
[:~I - Q(a' ,  p ' , ) lu ' (p~)(s)  ~< (dq r'[s, (a', P~)I). (25) 
On the other hand, by Lemma 1, for any s e S -  S' ,  
u'(p'*)(s) = exp( - ~t) T, (a ~, I~ ~,)[~I - Q(a' ,  'p,) ]u ' ' (/1 , ) (s)  dt 
= Ec~,,;~ exp( -~t ) [c t l  - O(a ~, ' ' u,)]u(~,)(s,) dt  Is,, = s 
(s, denotes the state of  the game system at time t e [0, ~) )  
= E~.,,~I ~ + so = s . (26) 
(r is the first time for which s, arrives the stopped set S' )  
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Here, the second term of (26) can be written as 
If ] E~.,..~ {exp(-~t)[~I-Q(o',.~.)]u~(~:.)(s,)dt}lSo=S 
{ [Io ] } -- Et.,,,~l exp(-ez)E~,.~,~l exp( -~t) (cd  - Q(ai,  lx~.))ui( l~.)(s,+~)dtls , ISo = s 
(by the strong Markov property) 
= E~,d. ) [exp( -ez)u ' (#i , ) (s~)[s  o = s] 
= Et,, , , ) [exp(-  ~tz) (d',  r i(s~)) [So = s]. 
Hence (26) becomes 
#(~',)(s) = E~o,,,,;.,[~ 
by u'(p'*)(s') = (d', r i (s ' ) )  when s 'e  S '  
q 
[~I - Q(a' ,  p',)] #(p',)(s,) dt + exp( -  c~z) (d', r ' (s,)) lso = s ]  




ui(lai,)(s') = (d  i, r i (s ' ) )  for s 'e  S'. (28) 
From (25) and (27), we have 
#(#~.)(s)  <~ EI~,.j.~ exp( -  ctt) (d', ri[s,, (a ~,/x~)]) dt + exp( -e~) (d  i, r~(s~))is0 = s 
= (d  ~, 0~(a~,#.)(s)) for all a~sP(A').  (29) 
On the other hand, we have 
[eI - Q (~.)]ui(/~)(s) = (d  i, ri(s, ~.) )  for s e S - S' .  
So, by the same argument, used in (29). we obtain 
ui(pi .)(s) = (d  i, ~,i(~.)(s)>. (30) 
Therefore, by (29) and (30), f i .  is an equilibrium point for the function 
((d, O (')(s)b, 
where aT=(d~ . . . .  ,dn)E(L+) ". Then applying Lemma 1, we see that this f i ,  is a D-convex 
noncooperative equilibrium point. [] 
5. EQUIL IBR IUM POINT OF THE MODIF IED GAME 
RELATED TO A D-CONVEX EQUIL IBRIUM POINT 
In Theorem 1 of Section 4, we have shown that an equilibrium point of the modified n-person 
M arkov game (13) is a D-convex equilibrium point. We question the converse version of Theorem l, 
i.e. whether there exists such a weighting vector factor d e (L+)" such that a D-convex optimal 
multistrategy for the game (1) becomes an equilibrium point of the modified game (13). To answer 
this question, we introduce the convexity for a set E with respect to the given convex cone 
D = L U {0}. 
Definition 3 
A subset E c R m is said to be D-convex if E + D is convex in W'. 
For simplicity, we let W~,(~)= H~,(p ;) + D-  ~b~(~)(s). Then, W~(~) always contains the origin 
0 since both D and H~(#") - ~k ~(~)(s) contain 0 vector. The set W~(~) is a translation of H~(#") + D 
by ~k'(~)(s). So if H~(/~ f) is a D-convex set then W~(~) is convex in R m. 
Now, we would establish the following theorem. 
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Theorem 2 
Let ~,  be a D-convex noncooperative equil ibrium point of  the original n-person Markov game 
(1). I f  , t~, J ,  i eNare  D-convex and, for all i eN ,  
cl[ W[.] M ( -c l  D) = {0}, (31) 
where clE denotes the closure of E and W; = W[.(B,). Then ~,  is an equilibrium point of the 
modified game (13) for some d ie  L +. i e N, That is, for each i e N, there is some d 'e  L + such that 
(d  r, O~(~,)(s))  ~ (d r, t)'(6 ~, pi,)(s)) for all a ie  P(A'). 
Proof 
Suppose that, for some i ~ N, there is no d~e L + such that 
(d  i ,~o'(~,)(s))  < (d',  r i i a, t# (a , / t , ) ( s ) )  for all ~ P(A'), 
i.e. 
(W~,) * f3 L + = 0, (32) 
where (W',)* is the positive polar cone of W~. Since int L + # 0 and (W~)* M int L + = 0, by the 
separation theorem for two disjoint convex set, there is die ~", d' # 0, such that 
inf (d  ~, w)  >/ sup (d', d). (33) 
we (W~)* d~L t~ 
Since (Wr,)* ~0, it follows from (33) that 
(d  i ,d )~<0 for all d6L  ~. 
Hence die ( -  L+) * --= -c lD .  Similarly, clL + ~ 0. Thus, 
(d~,w)>~O for all w~(W~)* ,  
i.e. 
d ie (W~)** = cl[W]], Hence, cl[W~] M ( -c lD)  #-0 contains a nonzero d i, which contradicts (31). 
Therefore 
(WI~)* f l L+#0 fora l l  i~N, 
and so there exists d ie L + such that 
(d  i, O i (~,) (s) )  < (d',~kr(a',#;,)(s)) for all areP(Ai), 
which completes the proof  of the theorem. [] 
6. D -CONVEX NONCOOPERATIVE  EQUIL IBR IUM POINT  
AND SUPER-GRADIENTS 
" r f For O'(a', p')(s)e H,(p ), we define the lower support function V',(p;)(.). on L~ = L + U ~0;~ ~ by 
V~(~;)(d) = inf (d, ~,"(a ~, ~;)(s))  (34) 
o.i 
for each i ~ N and any d ~ L~-. 
Definition 4 
A function f :  E --+ • is called super-differentiable at d ~ E if there is a vector x e JR" such that 
f (d )  - . f (d )  ~< (d  - d, x )  for all d E E 
and such a vector x is called a super-gradient offa t  d. The set of all super-gradients at d is denoted 
by ~-,f(d). 
Discounted vector valued dynamic game model 237 
We have seen that the D-convex equilibrium point exists in the vector valued game system. So 
we show that the total expected iscounted vector loss of each player associated with the D-convex 
equilibrium point is a super-gradient of the lower support function, which we prove as follows. 
Theorem 3 
A mult is t rategy B is one of the D-convex equilibrium point of the game (1) associated with 
d ~e L + for i e N and an initial state s; then for any i ~ N 
Vii(lfi)( d' ) = ( d ~, ~b'(~)(s)) (35) 
if and only if t~'(~)(s) is a super-gradient of the lower support function Vi,(Id)(-) at d'~ L~; ~ ,
~b~(B)(s)E~Vii(#i)(d ~) for all i EN, 
or equivalently 
*l i i i i V,(/~ )(d) <d-d ' , tp ' (~) (s ) )  for all deL~-. (36) I~ ,(/~ ) (d ) -  ~< 
ProQ[" 
I f  we take d = 0 in (36), then we obtain 
Vi~(#;)(d i) >1 (d  i, ~b~(~)(s)) for all i e N. 
So, from Lemma 1, /.i is a D-convex equilibrium point. 
Conversely, if ~ is a D-convex equilibrium point associated with d ie  L~ + for i ~ N, we have 
V~(#i)(d ') = ( d', ¢~(~)(s)). (37) 
On the other hand, for any d ~ Lo + 
V](l~i)(d) ~ (d, ~O~(~)(s)). (38) 
Thus, by the subtraction of (38) from (37), it follows that 
V~(v;)(d) - V~(lt")(d ~) ~ (d  - d ~, ¢'(fi)(s)), 
i.e. 
~O'(~)(s) ~ JV~(lJ)(d'). 
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